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THE FEDERAL POWER TO TAX AND TO SPEND
By G.

MERLE BERGMAN*

choosing this topic for an article I hesitated somewhat, fearing that the reader of pragmatic bent might avoid it in the
belief that the matter was no longer one of great significance to constitutional litigation. But I ruled in favor of it-I think safelybecause the transitory nature of our courts and the great interest
which this general topic has always had for constitutional scholars
suggests both a future and present utility. Even though the Supreme
Court of the United States is not today inclined to make fine distinctions which would impede the taxing and spending powers of
the Federal Government, it is not unlikely that the lawyers may
presently be called upon to assist the Court in a reorientation of its
theories in order to buttress in principle the advances it has made
in practice. This article is designed, in part, to suggest to the lawyer
the methodology by which this reorientation might be achieved.
The analysis which it presents is, admittedly, of a highly technical
and academic nature, but I believe that the fundamental concepts
which it contains and their delineated relation to the principal cases
will more than repay the reader for his enforced concentration.
Unfortunately the interpretation of the Constitution in most
of our law schools follows a rather antiquated pattern. The instructor too often dwells upon superficial, trivial, or transitory
elements of a case to the exclusion of underlying principles upon
which the determination rests. He too often neglects to distinguish
between what the courts say and what they do. This failure to see
the forest for the trees is a malady to which constitutional law is
especially susceptible since it offers innumerable opportunities for
distracting metaphysical discussion. Met with this situation it is
best to substitute a consideration de novo in light of the language
of the instrument and the cumulative effect of the courts' decisions, rather than attempt a piece-meal analysis of the elements of
any given case. The resulting concepts are more than likely the
very ones which motivated the courts, though unencumbered by
the obfuscation which scattered cases and official language so
often create.
N

*Associate, Research Committee on International Federation, the University of Oklahoma. Author of "A World Legislature," Federation: the
Coming Structure of World Government, Howard 0. Eaton, ed., University of Oklahoma Press, 1944.
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.Applying this method to the present study I turn my attention
to Article I, -section 8, of the Constitution of the United States
which provides inter alia "The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uni form throughout the United States."'
This passage -iscommonly referred to as the "taxing" clause.
Grammatically speaking it consists of more than one clause. As the
vehicle for a grant of power it has been referred to in the singular
because it. is commonly held to embody but a single power. In the
latter sense, as well as in the strict grammatical sense, the passage
might more properly be considered in the plural, since it confers
two powers upon the Congress instead of one. I doubt that anyone
has ever questioned the power of Congress to spend, but it has
been generally thought that this power is derived by implication
from the taxing power. I believe, however, that evidence about to
be set forth tends to prove that the spending power is expressly
conferred in the passage quoted above, whereas the taxing power
is considerably different from that which is generally credited
under this clause.. In order to establish my proposition, a major
portion of this discussion is necessarily devoted to a consideration
of punctuation and grammatical construction; but the distinctions
which are about to be made are significant not for the passive
observation of a grammatical truth, but rather for the active application of that truth in the history of the Supreme Court of the
United States.
POsING A PARAIOX

The framers of the Constitution surely did not believe that
Congress had"to have any special grant of power in order to tax
for the purpose of carrying out the other delegated powers. It was
understood that Congress could do this freely under the necessary and proper clause. - A tax could be used to whatever extent
it might lend itself as a proper means of accomplishing the end in
view, provided only that the tax be laid in conformity with the rules
established,3 and that the end be a legitimate one under the dele'Text, Department of State, United States Government Printing Office.
Publication No. 539 (1934).
-Article I, section 8, confers upon Congress the power: "To make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
3See Article I, sections 8 and 9.
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gated powers. The so-called taxing clause, therefore, would be
surplusage if it were designed to confer this power to tax as a
means to an end. If this were the sole purpose of the clause there
would be no justification for it; and if it were to serve as merely
an additional purpose, it is difficult to understand why it should be
necessary to confer this power again, even in company with another. Yet most commentators, and probably most judges, regard
the so-called taxing clause as the sole source of the Congressional
power to tax. They seldom relate the necessary and proper clause
to this function, although much of what passes for taxation can be
justified under that clause alone. Obviously, if the power to tax
does not require a separate grant when serving as a means to a
legitimate end, the separate taxing clause must serve some other
purpose. It is not difficult to understand that the collection of money
may often prove to be a convenient means of accomplishing sonic
desired end. Its nature is compelling, and its subtle presence often
prods unwilling hands to seize the burden of an undertaking. But
the collection of money may also be an end in itself. It is advantageous for any government to be able to collect money for no
other purpose than to fill the treasury in anticipation of the future.
This power to collect money for revenue alone, as an end in itself,
is quite distinct from the power to collect it as a means to some
further end.4 I suggest, therefore, that the taxing clause confers
this power to tax for revenue alone, distinct from the power to
tax as a means to an end which is conferred by the necessary
and proper clause.
There will probably be no violent disagreement with the general
proposition just set forth. For over one hundred and fifty years,
since the writing of the Constitution, men have taken it for granted
that Congress has the power, if it so desires, to collect money for
no other purpose than for revenue. And they have also taken it
for granted that the power is derived from the taxing clause. Such
a power is so fundamental to efficient government that it is hard
to conceive of any government being without it. Yet under the
popular interpretation of the taxing clause, no such power is provided. It is construed as giving Congress the power to collect
-taxes in order 1) to pay the debts, 2) to provide for the common
defense, and 3) to provide for the general welfare. Where, then, is
the power to collect for revenue alone? If it is to be subsumed
under the power to tax for the general welfare, the concept of
"general welfare" as used in this passage is also broad enough to
4See note 11, infra.
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include the payment of debts and the provision relating to the
common defense. Yet these things are mentioned separately, and
so there would seem to be no justification for giving any such
broad meaning to "general welfare." Clearly, the power to tax
for three stated purposes would not include the power to tax for
no purpose at all. The very enumeration would preclude a power
to tax for revenue only. And yet we all know that Congress has
this power. We know that the Supreme Court has upheld the power
to tax for no apparent purpose other than the purpose of collecting it. We also know that the Court has invalidated a tax when it
expressly professed to be, and clearly was, for the general welfare.5 The only fair conclusion is that the Supreme Court of the
United States pays lip service to one interpretation of the Constitution, and decides its cases on the basis of another. It would be
interesting to discover how this paradox came about, why it is
perpetuated, and how it can be resolved in terms of the real meaning of the clause.
THE CLAUSE CONSTRUED

There is something. hallowed about an error perpetuated
throughout one hundred and fifty years. It seems almost disrespectful to reveal it after the elapse of so much time.0 Certainly it
would be unwise to lay the blame for such a popular misconception
upon any one person. But in a general way we may at least speculate upon its origin. If we turn back to the quoted passage of the
Constitution at the beginning of this article we note the presence
of a comma between the noun series ending with the word "excises"
and the phrase "to pay the debts." Surely the clause would not be
interpreted as it has been for one hundred and fifty years if the
first person called upon to do so had made a careful study of this
significant punctuation. The matter of punctuation was exceedingly important to the framers of the Constitution, and we have
evidence that they regarded it rather closely. 7 With this in mind it
5

See discussion of the Butler case on page 343, infro.
aBut one is reminded here of Holmes' famous remark: "It is revolting to
have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the
(The Path of the Law.)
time of Henry I.
7Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, vol. 3. Appendix A.
CCCXLIV, 456. The memoirs of John Quincy Adams relates an ,incident
involving a variation between a copy of the Constitution which he edited for
the Government and the original enrollment, resulting in a dispute between
Smyth declared himself satisfied that he
himself find General Smyth. ...
had been mistaken in his suspicions, and that the error of punctuation in the
volume of the journal of the Convention, consisting in the substitution of a
colon for a semicolon... was not a deliberate and wilful forgery of mine to
falsify the Constitution.'
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might be well to examine the construction of the taxing clause
and discover what it was originally designed to connote.
I think it is no exaggeration to say that since the days of the
first English grammar it has been an invariable rule of sentence
structure and punctuation that a modifier is never separated from
the word or phrase it modifies. It would be a new system entirely
if adverbial modifiers were separated by a comma from the verbs
they modified, or adjectives from their nouns. Yet, this is the
system we must advocate if we read the phrase "to pay the debts"
as though it meant "in order to pay the debts." The word "to" is
employed as the sign of the infinitive. The infinitive, of course,
may be used in a sentence as a noun, an adjective, or an adverb. 8
Adjectives and adverbs are modifiers, and whenever the word "to"
is used to mean "in order to" it introduces an infinitive form eiiiployed as a modifier. Whether it be an adjective or an adverb the
modifier can not be separated by a comma from the word or
phrase it modifies. In the passage quoted above, "to pay the debts"
must modify the preceding noun series if we take it to mean "in
order to pay the debts," and since it is used as an adjective in this
sense it could not be separated from the noun series which it
modifies. It is separated, however, and we can only conclude from
this that it is not intended to be a modifier at all, but is, instead,
part of a noun series itself. "To tax to pay" is one thing, 'whereas
"to tax, to pay" is quite another. In the first instance "to pay"
modifies "to tax " whereas in the second "to tax" and "to pay"
are coordinate parts of speech.
Since the days of Shakespeare and before, no author of recognized ability who has employed the word "to" in the sense of "in
order to" has set it apart by a comma from the noun or phrase it
modifies. Yet we are asked to believe that the authors of the
Constitution, who were among the finest grammarians of their (lay,
were unaware of this simple and invariable rule. Or what is worse,
-we are asked to believe that they, knowing the rule, ignored it.
It would be more fitting, and more truthful, to admit that for one
hundred and fifty years we have been misreading what they wrote;
it is unlikely that the fault is with their writing. With the comnia
present, the passage can not be read: "The Congress shall have
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, [in
81 am indebted to Frederic E. Faverty. Chairman of the Department of
English at Northwestern University, for confirming my original hypothesis.
Professor Faverty, however, is not responsible for the form of this presentation since he was not consulted with reference to the identical problem and
has not subsequently been advised of its nature.
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order] to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and
general welfare of the United States," but should be read: "The
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts
and excises, [and] to pay the debts and provide for the common
defense and general -velfare [out of the money collected]." If the
words "in order" had actually been inserted in the Constitution
following the word "excises," the comma would then have been
proper, since the phrase "to pay the debts" would no longer modify
the preceding noun series, but instead would be part of a parenthetical phrase introduced by the words "in order."
If the word "to," separated as it is from the preceding noun
series by a comma, can not mean "in order to," it must be used
to introduce the second in a series of separate clauses. If Congress
does not have the power to collect taxes in ordcr to pay the debts
etc., it has the power to collect taxes and to pay the debts. This
difference is more than nominal, and if clearly understood, .serves
as a key to the analysis of the many tax cases which have been
decided by the Supreme Court. It resolves the paradox which we
have found to exist. But before proceeding to an analysis of the
cases, we ought to consider further the actual construction of the
quoted passage to meet any lurking objections which might be
troubling the scholars.
To many, an error of one hundred and fifty years is preferred
to a recent discovery of the truth. Thus, a distinguished constitutional lawyer of my acquaintance has suggested that even if the
view here presented is technically correct, the profession must
give credence to the traditional interpretation. This argument reveals the frailty of human nature in its most polished form, and for
that reason alone carries with it much force. But it can hardly
satisfy the sincere scholar who is interested in the truth rather
than in the antiquity of a misconception. Therefore, when pressed
for some better reason, the distinguished gentleman suggested
-that the matter of the comma could be settled by the simple expediehcy of admitting that the rules of punctuation have changed
since the days of the Constitution. This admission would certainly
put further discussion to rest if it embodied the truth, but it does
not. The Constitution itself offers proof that the rules of punctuation at that time were no different from our own. In the very same
section with which we are concerned Congress is given the power,
"To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of
the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." In this
passage, the phrase "'to execute the Laws of the Union" clearly
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means "in order to," and modifies the preceding phrase, but it is
not separated by a comma from the phrase it modifies. If there
were such a comma, the passage would serve to confer two powers
instead of one, since the phrase "to execute" would then become
a coordinate part of speech. It seems incongruous that the authors
of the Constitution would employ proper punctuation in this
passage and yet fail to employ it in identical construction within
the same section. The only fair inference is that the constructions
are not identical, and that the punctuation is proper in each instance.
My distinguished friend has also suggested that if the clause
introduced by the words "to pay the debts" is to be construed as
the second in a series, as I contend, the word "to" should appear
in front of the word "provide." This would be true if the word
"provide" introduced the third in the series. But it does not, as
I shall presently establish. The powers conferred are not 1) to
collect taxes, 2) to pay debts, and 3) to provide for the common
defense and general welfare, but are rather 1) to collect taxes, and
2) to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general
welfare. The third in the series has yet to appear. In other words,
"to collect, to pay and to provide" is one thing, whereas "to collect, to pay and provide" is still another. The omission of the
word "to" before the word "provide" clearly implies that paying
and providing are parts of a single power which encompasses
both paying and providing-namely, spending. If the "to" had
been included, it would have indicated that the word "provide"
was in its nature different from the word "pay," and that it introduced a sepirate power. Since the word "provide" is capable
of several interpretations, the authors of the Constitution intended
to show, by omitting the word "to," that its function in the sentence
was identical with that of the word "pay." In short, they indicated
that it was to be employed in a monetary sense, and in no other.
Just as the debts were to be paid out of the taxes collected, so the
common defense and general welfare were to be provided for by
an expenditure, and by no other means. 9 An entirely different re9
This same proposition, which was reached on independent grounds, appears in (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 551, in an article by Professor Edward S.
Corwin. At page 553 Professor Corwin says, "In the second place, the phrase
'to pay the debts,' which means the debts of 'the United States' at the end
of the clause, and which designates a purpose of money expenditure only .. "
From this and other evidences Professor Corwin is led to conclude that the
taxing is limited by the phrase "to pay the debts." He says, "... and we must
therefore accept Jefferson's contention, in his Opinion on the Bank, that the
power to lay taxes to provide for the general welfare of the United Stateq is
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suit, :and one never intended, would have been brought about had
the words "pay" and "provide" been made to encompass separate
powers.
The significance of this distinction can best be appreciated after
considering another objection which has been raised. It is argued
that if the taxing-spending clause is to be read as though the words
"to pay the debts" introduced the second in a series, the power to
provide for the general welfare is so broad that Congress would
be empowered to do anything under it, and the significance of our
federal system would be destroyed. As already noted, however,
the power to provide for the common defense and general welfare
is, taken along with the power to pay the debts, a spending power.

It is significant that the authors of the Constitution did not give
Congress the power to "promote" the general welfare, although
this word is used in the preamble to the Constitution. The fact
that-the word is employed in one place and not in another where
the construction is similar, should at once suggest that the omission
is significant. The word "promote," unlike the word "provide,"
does not readily suggest the same purpose as the word "pay." Had
the word "promote" been used in place of the word "provide" the
result would have been to confer upon Congress a power of tinbounded extent. When we take together the fact that the word
"provide" was judiciously selected, that it was not preceded by
the word "to," and that the entire phrase "to pay the debts and
provide for the common defense and general welfare" immediately
follows the clause in which Congress is given the power to tax,
the only fair inference is that the power to provide is only a power
to spend that -which the preceding clause authorizes to be collected. In other words, whatever can not be provided for by
spending, may not, under this clause, be provided for at all.
If the construction here set forth is proper, some explanation
as to why the word "and" does not appear after the word "excises" seems to be in order. I have already suggested that the
word "provide" does not introduce the third in the coordinate
the power 'to lay taxes for the purpose of providing for the general welfare.'"
Professor Corwin's conclusion appears to me to be a non sequitur, but it is
not-difficult to understand why he reached it. Unquestionably he conceives the
only alternative to be an admission of a plenary power derived from general
welfare. His own explanation, however, that it is limited to a monetary
sense would seem to-refute such a notion. Professor Corwin, like the rest of
us. has been accustomed too long to regard this whole problem as an "eitheror" proposition. The notion is that either "general welfare" limits the taxing
power, or it is itself an unlimited power. Neither is correct, however, since
there is-a third possibility. It is an intrinsic part of a separate spending power,
and is limited in that power to its monetary function.
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series. In a series of three, the word "and" is a proper conjunction joining the second and third parts of the series. It is habitually
omitted between the first and second parts of the series. The conjunction, therefore, is employed as a device to indicate the conclusion of the series. The fact that it is omitted after the word
"excises" merely indicates that the following member of the series
is not the final member. It is true that the second enumerated
power in the series is introduced by the words "to pay the debts,"
and it is also the final power in the series; but it is not the final
clause in the series. The series, in this case, consists of two powers
and one restriction. Normally a group of powers will be included
in one series and a group of restrictions in another. It is a rare
occurrence when both powers and restrictions are included in the
same series. But when powers and restrictions concern subjects as
intimately related as those in the passage with which we are concerned, it is perfectly proper to join them in a single series. In
such a case, it is the subject matter, rather than the identity of the
several parts, which unifies the series. The infrequency of such an
arrangement, however, has led some to believe that it never occurs.
Consequently, when it does occur it runs the risk of being completely ignored; and in the present case it has been successfully
overlooked for one hundred and fifty years. This has probably
been brought about in part as well by the fact that the final clause
of the series is introduced by the word "but." Yet when we consider that the nature of the final clause is a restriction, this does
not seem at all strange. The word "but" is especially appropriate to
introduce a restriction. No other conjunction performs the function as well. The fact that this word is rarely used to introduce
the last in a series of coordinate clauses is proof of nothing except
its rarity. It is a perfectly proper conjunction joining the final
clause with the preceding clause, and it is rarely employed in a
series only because a series rarely includes both powers and restrictions. The use of the semicolon between the second and third
parts of the series, whereas a comma suffices to separate the first
and second parts of the series, 10 merely indicates that the suc' 0 lt is of no little significance that several drafts of the Constitution show
a semicolon in place of the disputed comma. The use of the semicolon, of
course, merely confirms what has been set forth in the text, and effectively
refutes any argument on behalf of the notion that what follows the semicolon modifies what precedes it. Madison, in his Journal of the Constitutional
Convention, vol. 2 at 753 et seq. sets forth his version of the final draft of tile
Constitution as it was signed by the members of the Convention. It is striking
to observe that here a semicolon appears in place of the comma. His "memo,"
Letters and Other Writings of James Madison, vol. iv, 131-133 discusses
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ceeding inember of the series is to be regarded somewhat differently from the preceding members. At the very most the semicolon may
be looked-upon as a warning device, and certainly was never intended to be read as a period, as some have done. It is perfectly
true, of course, that the authors of the Constitution were not
limited in their choice. They could have treated the restriction
separately from the powers by closing off the series with the word
"and" after the word "excises." In such a case the series would
have consisted of two powers, rather than of two powers and a
restriction. They recognized, however, the close relationship between the powers and the restriction, and made their choice accordingly. Having decided to treat the restriction along with the
powers as part of a single series, their choice of punctuation and
sentence structure could not have been more perfect. Some might
think a semicolon would be preferable after the word "excises,"
and this may indeed have been the original punctuation, but the
conmma may be used interchangeably without affecting the fundamental construction. The use of punctuation after the word "excises" and the omission of the word "and," is unquestionably proper
if the passage be construed as a series. Construing it in this manner, the sentence should be regarded for what it is-the purposeful
selection of accomplished artists.
There remains only one objection to meet, and this analysis
of the grammatical construction of the passage will have been completed. The objection stems from the fact that the restriction in the
taxing-spending clause applies to the taxing power, and yet, if
the interpretation which I suggest is correct, it follows the spending power. The argument is made that it should logically follow
the taxing power, which it restricts. And if that be admitted, the
next step is to force an admission that the clause which I regard
as a separate vehicle for the spending power is really only the tag
- end of the taxing power, as is traditionally urged. The flaw in this
reasoning is with the primary assumption that a restriction on the
taxing power must necessarily follow the taxing power. This is
not true if the final clause is one among a series, as I contend. In
a series consisting of two powers and one restriction it is only
ti4 practice of employing commas and semicolons interchangeably. Madison
indicates that the meaning of the clause is identical with commas vice semicolons, but is troubled when a colon is substituted. In the most important
draft reported by Mfadison there is a semicolon in place of the comma; the
meaning is the same as if the comma were there, but the semicolon strengthens
our argument since it shows in bold relief how ridiculous it is to argue that the
several parts of the sentence are anything but coordinate parts of speech.
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logical for the restriction to follow the powers. It would break the
logical sequence and symmetry to have first a power, then a restriction, and then a power. Certainly no one would contend that
the restriction should precede the powers; before there can be
a restriction there must be that which it restricts. Nor would it be
logical for the spending power to precede the taxing power,"

The taxing power creates the instrumentality which the spending
power employs, and must therefore come first in the sentence
structure as well as in logic. If, therefore, the powers should precede the restriction, and the taxing power should precede the spending power, it is difficult to see how the restriction could be put
anywhere except after the spending power. The fact that the restriction on the taxing power must follow the spending power if

the passage be given the interpretation I favor, should influence no
one to believe that the spending power is not separate from the
taxing power. All of the evidence which we have examined in the
construction of the passage indicates that it expressly confers two
liThis, however, was originally the case, and apparently the change was
effected in order to improve the style and logic. Madison in his Journal, vol. 2,
at 596 reports that the Convention agreed to an amendment of the clause to
read: "The Legislature shall fulfil the engagements and discharge the debts
of the United States; and shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts and excises." From this it seems clear that the genesis of the clause is
such as to preclude any notion that the payment of the debts was meant to
limit the collection of the taxes. Moreover, in the draft reported for Monday,
August 6th, the taxing clause immediately precedes the commerce clause
and is independent of any limitations:
"The Legislature of the United States shall have power to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises;
"To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several states ;"

This is reported in Farrand, op. cit.. vol. 2, 181, and seems to substantiate the
argument that originally the taxing power was intended to create a general
treasury unlimited in extent by any designated purpose. In Farrand, op. cit.,
vol. 2, 152, we are given a further clue as to the subsequent development of
the clause by means of the Report of the Committee of Detail which sets
forth the general legislative powers with their exceptions and restrictions for
purposes of guides in future drafting of specific grants. The clause appears
in these terms: "To raise money by taxation, unlimited as to sum, for the
(future) past (or) [&] future debts and necessities of the union and to establish rules for collection." Now it is apparent that the reference to debts did
not serve as a limitation upon the collection of funds, since there was special
provision for this, indicating thereby that the members of the Convention
regarded any limitation on the collection as separate from the payment
of debts. Obviously, the reference made to the debts and necessities of the
union was to serve as the basis for a separate spending power. It indicated
the purposes for which the treasury was to be spent, not the purpose for
which it was to be collected. The statement that there was to be no limit
upon the amount of money which could be raised clearly supports this interpretation. The concern of the fathers was not to limit or to put breaks upon the
acquisition of funds, but to make certain that they would be put to a proper
use.
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separate powers upon the Congress. 2 The first is the power to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises. This power is unlimited for revenue purposes and is not restricted by the words
which follow. The second power is a power to pay the debts and
provide for the common defense and general welfare out of the
money collected. 3 The final clause in the passage is a restriction
on the taxing power, requiring that all duties, imposts and excises
be.uniform throughout the United States.
The relationship of the powers and restriction included in the
series of the quoted passage can, perhaps, be better understood by
the use of an illustrative sentence. Suppose that an agent were to
receive authority in the following terms: "You are authorized to
mine gold from this land, to pay the operating costs and obtain
' 2 Nothing serves to illustrate this better than the following excerpts

from Madison's letter to Andrew Stevenson, in which he refers to the activities of the Committee of Eleven. The report is in Farrand, op. cit., vol. 3,
Appendix A, CCCLXXII, 484: "On the 21st of Augst. this last committee
reported a clause in the words following 'The Legislature of the U. States
shall have power to fulfil the engagements, which have been entered into by
Congress, and t6 discharge as well the debts of the U. States, as the debts
incurred by the several States, during the late war, for the conmn delence
and general welfare'; conforming herein to the 8th. of the Articles of Confederation, the language of which is, that 'all charges of war and all other
expences that shall be incurred for the common defence and general welfare, and allowed by the U. S. in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of
a common treasury' &c.
"On the 22d. of Augst. the committee of five reported among other additions to the clause giving power 'to lay and collect taxes, imposts & excises,'
a clause in the words following 'for payment of the debts and necessary expences', with a proviso qualifying the duration of Revenue laws.
"This Report being taken up, it was moved, as an amendment, that the
clause should read 'the Legislature shall fulfil the engagements & discharge
the debts of the U. States:
"On the 23d. of August the clause was made to read 'the Legislature shall
fulfil the engagements and discharge the debts of the U. States, and shall
have the power to lay & collect taxes, duties, imposts & excises' the two
powers relating to taxes & debts being merely transposed."
The fact that these "two powers"-paying the debts and taxing-were
transposed time and again until the committee on style finally decided that the
taxing power should precede the spending power, would indicate conclusively
that they were two powers instead of one. If it were only a taxing power restricted by the payment of debts there could be no transposition. Aside from
the fact that Madison specifically refers to them as "two powers," their
genesis and transposition leaves no room for any other conclusion.
'3 The question of a separate taxing and a separate spending power should
not be confused with the question of whether "general welfare" added anything to the powers of Congress. The dispute between Madison and Hamilton
on this point is well known, and it seems obvious that Hamilton's contention
that "general welfare" included something other than the delegated powers
is more logical than Madison's notion. If Hamilton were not correct the
phrase would be pure surplusage, but in any event his view prevailed. It is
significant that 'Hamilton in his discussion of this subject always referred to
the "spending power," and there is nothing to indicate that he ever looked
upon the term as a limitation on the taxing power.
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food for all the men working here; but not more than half the
gold in the mine may be taken out." It is at once evident that the
agent is not authorized to mine gold in order to pay the operating
costs and obtain food for the men. Such would have been the meaning if there had been no comma after the word "land." With the
comma present, however, the agent is authorized to mine gold and
to pay the costs and obtain food. Moreover, the use of the words
"pay" and "obtain" as coordinate parts of a single power indicates
that their function is identical. In other words, the agent is not
authorized to steal food or to barter away the mining property to
obtain it. He must employ the same means of obtaining food as he
does in paying the costs. Finally, the fact that this power follows
that which authorizes the mining of gold indicates that the second
power is to be carried out by means of the instrumentality created
in the first. In other words, the agent is authorized to mine gold
and then to use the gold to pay the costs and obtain food. The
final restriction bn the amount of gold which may be mined bears
the same relationship to the preceding powers as the tax restriction bears to the powers to tax and to spend. It is the third of a
series, and as such it is properly placed. Because it is a restriction
it is introduced by the word "but" and is preceded by a semicolon. Logic and grammar lead inevitably to a single conclusion
that which I have already amply drawn.
THE CLAUSE APPLIE.D

It is not necessary, however, to rely upon logic and grammar
alone to establish my hypothesis. The inherent propriety of the
construction for which I contend is copiously reflected in the decisions of our courts and in the thinking of our people. If the Constitution gave Congress the power to tax "to provide for the general welfare," as is commonly supposed, the Federal Government
would no longer be one of delegated authority. As already suggested, a tax can be a powerful means to an end, as well as an
end in itself. It can regulate, coerce, destroy, and in varying degrees control the item or activity against which it is directed. The
term "general welfare" is not one which may be defined with any
precision. Consequently. if the Federal Government could really
tax to provide for the general welfare it could, in every instance,
accomplish whatever it set out to do regardless of whether or not
the specific activity had been delegated to it. The overpowering
force of this simple truth did not escape the Supreme Court of the
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Uinited States. It has considered itself obligated by usage to pay
lip service to the proposition that Congress can tax for the general
welfare, but at the same time it has consistently decided that Congress can not. It has ruled time and again that a tax which is not
for revenue purposes or which is not justified as a means to carry
out some other delegated power of the Congress violates the Tenth
Amendment and is void. If there were a power to tax for the
general welfare the Tenth Amendment could have no significance
as long as Congress were exercising that power. By this deft
device--the hocus pocus of the Tenth Amendment-the Supreme
Court has clearly demonstrated that there is no power to tax for
the general welfare, but only a power to tax for revenue or to carry
out one of the delegated powers. This is precisely what I have
argued the Constitution expressly provides.
Of further significance is the fact that the Court, although
denying the right of Congress to tax for the general welfare, has
upheld its right -to spend for the general welfare.1 4 This fully conforms to my reading of the Constitution. It also conforms to the
inherent nature of the spending process which motivated the authors of the Constitution in the first instance to confer such a
power. The power to spend is limited by the amount of money
which Congress has to spend. Although we have come to regard
our nation as the proverbial horn of plenty, Congress, nevertheless, is prevented by political considerations from exceeding the
public conscience in its expenditures. Moreover, there is a limit
to the amount of compliance which money can purchase. In short,
the power to spend, unlike the power to tax, can not be looked
upon as a coercive measure, and may be readily bestowed without fear of upsetting the delicate balance of our federated government. This being true, the Court is not justified in searching for
motives behind Congressional appropriations. If on the face of it
the expenditure is for the general welfare, Congress is dearly exercising a power bestowed upon it, and the courts of the nation would
be hard put to explain how a valid exercise of power can be
anything but valid.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the cases it is of great importance that we understand and appreciate the significance of
this phrase "on the face of it." The Supreme Court has frequently
stated that it will never look behind the act itself in order to
discover the purpose for which it was adopted, but will perform
24Cf. the Child Labor Tax case on page 346, infra, with the case of
Helvering v. Davis on page 352, infra.
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its judicial function "on the face of it."'15 Scholars are often prone
to greet this pronouncement with cynical disbelief. They argue
that the Court has often looked beyond the immediate purpose of
the act as expressed on the face of it to discover another purpose
partially hidden, thus giving the lie to its pure intention. But the
critics of the Court have merely failed to distinguish between the
faithful observance of a judicial rule, and variation in the findings
of fact. When the Court declares that it will look only to the immediate purpose of the act as evidenced on the face of it, it is simply
announcing adherence to a common sense rule. We all are aware
that every purpose and consequence is followed by others. Purpose engenders purpose, and effect engenders effect. No one can
limit in his own mind the single purpose of a spoken word. In
uttering the word one purpose probably stands out as preeminent,
but a hundred others are submerged and may ultimately be recognized. And who can foresee the consequences of a single act? A
gesture of friendship may be mistaken and ultimately envelop the
entire world in war. But surely a man is not to be held to account
for all that follows when his first purpose is peace. The human
mind is not so constructed that it can anticipate the manifold
consequences of an act, or swear before God that it embodies but
a single purpose. Knowing this, the Supreme Court has allowed
for human limitations and is not prepared to hold Congress to a
fuller accounting than it would hold itself. The Court recognizes
that it is incapable of ferreting out the many purposes and consequences of a single Congressional act. An act of Congress on the
face of it purports to a single accomplishment. Yet we all know
that if we were to scrutinize the circumstances which gave it birth
a hundred other purposes would unfold. And from our knowledge
of things we know that a thousand we never suspected are very
real forces in the background. But is each of them to be anticipated
from the very start? Is the Court to set itself up as an Ahnighty
Judge? If the Court were to look beyond the single immediate
purpose expressed on the face of the act, where would it call a
halt? There could be no stopping, of course, and this is a very
good reason why the Court has said it will not look beyond the
expressed purpose of the act. And what the Court has said it
would not do, it has not done.1 6
' 5 See Sonzinsky v. United States on page 348, if ra.
X6Hart, Processing Taxes and Protective Tariffs. (1936) 49 Harv. L.
Rev. 610, professes to see a departure from the Court's avowed policy. But
Mr. Hart confuses purpose as it appears on the face of the act with motives
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-:The charge of inconstancy to the policy which it has avowed is
levelled against the Court largely because the different members
who have professed to look only to the act itself to discover the
pui-pose, have found different purposes as a result of their search.
The majority at different times has discovered different purposes in
what appears to be the same situation. This, however, demonstrates
no unfaithfulness to the principle which the court has enunciated;
it merely proves what we already know-that men do not see the
same set of facts in the same way. Suppose we tell A that B is
about to phone him and offer him an excellent job. We then ask
A to explain the immediate purpose of B's call. He might reply,
truly, that B's purpose was to talk to him. Or if his thought were
attuned to a different element he might answer, with equal truth,
that B's purpose was to offer him a job. And if A's optimism were
properly stimulated he might be induced to say that the real and
immediate purpose of B's call was to open the way to a bright
new world. If a single man can view a few simple facts in so many
forms, depending upon his mood and conditioning, imagine the
variation there may be when a complicated set of facts-is viewed
by -different men! When the Court says that it looks only to the
immediate purpose as it is expressed on the face of the act, there
is no cause to doubt the sincerity of this avowal merely because
the several justices differ in their estimation of the immediate purpose. Nor is there any cause for doubt even when the same set of
circumstances is differently interpreted by the same justice at
different times. Facts must be viewed through human eyes and none
is immune from occasional myopia. Where complicated enactments
eibody the facts which must be judged, the wonder is not that
justices differ in their estimates, but rather that they ever agree.
For. example, consider the situation which was presented in
United States v. Butler.17 In that case a tax had been levied upon
the processors of cotton. If nothing more had appeared on the face
of the act it would-be difficult to understand how it could be regarded as anything other than an excise for revenue purposes.
And; indeed, it was so held by the dissent. But associated in the
act was an expenditure which purported to be for the general
welfare. The Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to employ
to be discovered elsewhere. The Court never declared that it would not seek
out the purpose of the act, but only that it would not go beyond the act itself

to do so. See Cushman, Social and Economic Control Through Federal Taxation, (1934) 18 MINNESOTA LAw REviEw 759 at 777 for a proper statement

of the distinction.
17(1936) 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed. 477.
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the proceeds of the tax for the purpose of removing surplus agricultural products from the market. This was to be accomplished
by payments to the farmers in return for their cooperation. The
inclusion of this provision led the majority to conclude that the
immediate purpose of the act was to regulate agriculture. The dissent pointed out that the tax itself was not regulatory, and argued
with a great deal of cogency that agriculture was not affected by
the mere levying of a tax upon the processor. The dissent felt that
the appropriation could not alter the nature of the tax as a revenue
measure. It was included in the same act with the tax in order that
the tax might serve as a convenient measure of the appropriation.
This view was adopted in Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United Stats,"
in which Mr. Justice Sutherland explained that the tax in question was "purely an excise tax upon a manufacturing process for
revenue purposes, and in no sense a regulation of the process itself ....
If Congress, for reasons deemed by it to be satisfactory,
chose to adopt the quantum of receipts from this particular tax as
the measure of the appropriation, we perceive no valid basis for
challenging its power to do so." In the Butler case, however, the
Court ruled that the immediate purpose of the act was not revenue,
but rather the regulation of agriculture. Either position is tenable,
depending upon what one looks to in order to discover the immediate purpose. The dissent looked only to that part of the act which
dealt with the tax. The majority examined the expenditure as well.
Both looked to the face of the act, and each found something
different.
Once having judged the facts, however, the Court is then
called upon to apply their findings to the principles of the law which
they consider applicable. If the Court believes, as the majority
did, that the immediate purpose of the tax was to regulate agriculture, the tax could not be sustained. Under such a view it would
have been a means to an end, and since the end was not one within
the scope of the delegated powers of Congress, the means could
not be justified under the necessary and pr6per clause. Since the
tax was not for revenue purposes it could not be justified under
the taxing clause (given the interpretation here set forth). If the
Court actually believed that Congress could tax for the general
welfare (the interpretation to which it has paid lip service), it
should have sustained the tax. The maintenance of a safe level of
farm commodities could surely be classed under the "general welfare." From these evidences, the logical conclusion is that the
18(1937) 301 U. S. 308, 57 S. Ct. 764, 81 L. Ed. 1122.
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Court -acknowledges the power to tax only for revenue purposes
or.as a means of carrying out one of the delegated powers. The decision of the Court in every case must rest upon its determination
of the purpose for which the tax is- levied. No tax can be valid
which is not for revenue or in pursuit of a delegated power, however closely it may be concerned with the general welfare.
-In
the Butler case there was some discussion concerning the
:coercive" nature of the tax. The dissent, after pointing out that
the taE was in no way coercive, suggested that the deci sion ought
not to rest upon that feature even if it were. The argument is made
that'if Congress has the taxing power it has the power also to
employ coercion to carry it out. This argument is true as far as
it goes. -But in this instance, if coercion is used at all, it is used
in the form of a tax. It is certainly true that a tax may be used
as a coercive means of regulating commerce or of performing any
one of the several delegated powers, but a tax can seldom be used
as a coercive means of collecting a tax. When a tax is coercive it is
a means rather than an end in itself, and when a tax is a means to
an end, the end product is usually not the tax itself. Armed force,
physical detention, or social ostracism may all be excellent coercive
means for the collection of taxes, but it is a little difficult to understand how -a tax itself can compel the collection of a tax. Therefore, there is a great deal of significance in labeling a particular
tax as coercive. As soon as this fact is established the tax can be
identified as a means to an end rather than an end in itself. As such
it can not be justified under the taxing clause. It must be justified,
if at all, under the necessary and proper clause as an appropriate
19
means for the accomplishment of a delegated power.
In the case of Ste-ward Machine Co. v. Davis"0 the Court was
confronted with a problem similar to that in the Butler case. Here
the tax was imposed upon employers of eight or more employees.
The funds were to be used under the Social Security Act for the
alleviation of old age unemployment---clearly to benefit the general
welfare. The situation, in essence, was no different from that of
the Butler case. But the Court held that in this instance the tax
-was clearly an excise for revenue purposes. Having so held, the
tax could be justified under the taxing clause. It is notable that
although the Court talked a great deal about the general welfare,
taking pains to establish the fact that the expenditure involved
9Schultz, Regulatory Taxes, (1939) 17 Taxes 515 at 515 et seq. ; (1936)
Brown, When is a Tax not a Tax?. 11 Ind. L. J. 399.
20(1937) 301 U. S. 548, 57 S. Ct. 883, 81 L. Ed. 1279.
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was for such a purpose, the tax itself was sustained solely because
it could be justified as a revenue measure. As in the Butler case,
there was no logical reason why the Court could not just as readily
have decided that the immediate purpose was to provide security for
the aged, which was a state problem. Having so decided, it could
then resort to its old stand-by, the Tenth Amendment, and rule that
the tax violated that sacred precinct. More properly, of course,
it could rule that the tax was not justified under the necessary and
proper clause. In any event the case turned upon a finding of fact,
and the Court chose to interpret the facts one way rather than
another. Either interpretation could have been sustained in so far
as logic is concerned, but the significance for our purpose is that
in either case the Court rejects the general welfare theory of the
taxing clause.
Differing considerably from the Butler and Ste-ward Machine
cases is the Child Labor Tax Case.21 Here there is no possibility of
deciding that the tax is for revenue purposes. It is clearly a coercive tax (although the element of coercion could be removed by
proper drafting of the legislation) put upon employers who knowingly employ children. In the absence of scienter the tax is remitted.
This identifies the tax as coercive, and leaves no room for argument
that it is not. As already noted, as soon as a tax can be identified
as coercive it must be justified under the necessary and proper
clause or not at all. This simplifies the task of the Court, since
the revenue purpose is immediately ruled out. On the face of the
act, then, it is not difficult to discover that the immediate purpose
is the regulation of child labor. This is not among the delegated
powers of Congress. Since it is not among the delegated powers any
means of attaining it is unlawful and the tax must fall. By the
ruling of the Court the tax (lid fall, and there is no room for
disagreement if we concede that the taxing clause does not give
Congress the power to tax for the general welfare. If we still cling
to the contention that it does, however, it is difficult to understand
how a tax to prevent child labor is anything but for the general
welfare. If Congress could tax for the general welfare this would
be a perfect instance where it ought to be permitted to do so. The
answer, of course, is that Congress can not tax for the general
welfare. If any hardy reader thinks otherwise he should be thoroughly acquainted with the error of his ways by the time we reach
the conclusion of this article. Perhaps I would apologize for my
2'lBailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., (1922) 259 U. S. 20, 42 S. Ct. 449, 66

L. Ed. 817.
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zeal in calling the obvious to the reader's attention, were it not for
the well-known testimony of Abraham Lincoln that such a technique is highly efficacious.
In the case of Hill v. Wallace - the tax involved was imposed on
every bushel of grain sold under a contract of sale for future delivery, but with an exemption of sales by members of a Board of
Trade designated by the Secretary of Agriculture as a contract
market. The exemption dearly marked this tax as a penalty. In
other words, it was a means to an end. As such it had to be
justified under the necessary and proper clause or not at all. The
Court found that agricultural control was the immediate purpose of
the tax. This was clearly beyond the powers of Congress, and
therefore the means employed to accomplish it-the tax--could not
be justified. This case falls within the same category as the Child
Labor Tax Case and is perfectly consistent with the instant thesis
that the taxing clause only confers a power to tax for revenue
purposes. It can not be consistent with or justified under the
notion that Congress has the power to tax for the general welfare.
If Congress had such a power the tax should have been upheld,
since agricultural stability is for nothing if it is not for the general
welfare.
In United States v. Constantie23 we are met with a case which
gives considerable latitude of decision on the facts. In this instance
the Congress imposed a tax of $25 on the business of a retail
dealer in malt liquor, but stipulated that there was to be a tax of
$1,000 if the business were conducted contrary to state law. The
Court held that the larger tax was dearly a penalty employed to
enforce the state law. Since the Congress had no broad police power
it could not employ the tax to carry out such a purpose. The dissenters, on the other hand, argued that it was entirely reasonable
to put one tax on a lawful business and a larger tax on an unlawful
business. They reasoned that the collection of excises from an unlawful undertaking required greater governmental expense and
that since the government had to expend large sums suppressing
crime it was only proper that the wrong-doers themselves should
pay a larger share of the operating cost of government. In short,
the dissent concluded that the tax was clearly for revenue purposes, since the larger tax was a reasonable classification under the
excise powers rather than a means of enforcing the state law.
Obviously, the position of either the majority or the dissent is
22(1922) 259 U. S. 44,42 S. Ct 453, 66 L. Ed. 822.
23(1935) 296 U. S. 287, 56 S. Ct. 223, 80 L. Ed. 233.
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tenable. If one decides that the classification is unreasonable the
larger tax is clearly a penalty. If it is a penalty it is a means to
an unlawful end and can not be justified. On the other hand, if
one believes .that the classification is reasonable, as the dissent
did, the tax is solely a revenue measure and can be justified under
the taxing clause.
In Sonzinsky v. United States24 the Court again affirms its
policy of examining only the face of the act in determining the
immediate purpose of Congress. The Court declares that it will
not go beyond the face of the act to reach its decision. In this
instance the National Firearms Act of 1934 imposed a $200 annual license tax on dealers in firearms. The Court explained that
the "tax is productive of some revenue" and added, "we are not
free to speculate as to the motives which moved Congress to impose it or as to the extent to which it may operate to restrict the
activities taxed. As it is not attended by an offensive regulation
and since it operates as a tax, it is within the national taxing
power." Nothing could be plainer than this to show that the Court
in its own mind is satisfied that the taxing clause confers a power
to tax for revenue purposes, and for no other purpose whatsoever.
At this point we should consider the case of McCray v. Unitcd
25
States..
A large tax was placed on yellow oleomargarine and the
argument was made that the natural consequence would be the
complete restriction of production. If this were true, the end resuilt would be that Congress could derive no revenue from this
source; and it would seem that such a tax would not be justified
as revenue. The Court upheld the tax. however, on grounds that
the face of the act revealed only a revenue measure. A tax of ten
cents on every pound of oleomargarine could not be regarded as
a penalty unless the Court were willing to take into account marketing conditions and its own knowledge of competition, This the
Court was not willing to do. If the act had contained anything on
the face of it which would indicate that the immediate purpose of
such a tax was the destruction of the product, the Court might
have decided otherwise, as it did in the Child Labor Tax Case.
But since the act itself was, on its face. a revenue measure, the
Court's decision was consistent with its avowed policy, and also
consistent with its practice of limiting the taxing clause to revenue
measures.
Although the Constitution does not confer a power to tax for
24(1937) 300 U. S. 506, 57 S. Ct. 554. 81 L. Ed. 772.
25(1906) 195 U. S. 5, 24 S. Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78.
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the general welfare, it does confer a power to spend for the general
welfare. This 1ower, as already noted, is limited by its own nature.
It contains no suggestion of coercive power whatsoever. There are
some who argue that it is reasonable to infer from this power to
spend for the general welfare that Congress also has the power to
use force' in order to carry out the spending power. They contend,
for example, that since Congress has the power to appropriate
money under the spending power for a national park, it also has
the power to employ eminent domain to compel land owners to
accept the Congressional appropriation.20 This latter power, however, is not fairly implied from the power to spend for the general
welfare. Congress can not condemn land for a national park under
the pretense that it is merely exercising its spending power. Such
condemnation proceedings can reasonably be inferred from the war
power, the power to acquire military sites, and other delegated
powers, but not from the spending power. When Congress was
given the power to spend the money collected as revenue and allocated to the general fund, i.e. not earmarked for any particular
purpose under the necessary and proper clause, it was a power
having to do with the control of the money involved and was not
intended to be a power over private individuals or their property.
A homey illustration may serve to establish this point more firmly.
Suppose that A gives his son some money and tells him that he may
use it to buy candy. A's son learns that the little boy next door has
just come into possession of a fine bag of candy, and he decides
that he wants to buy some of it. The boy next door is not willing
to sell it, but A's son, armed with his father's permission to use
his money to purchase candy, as well as a good right arm, compels
the neighbor boy to accept his money in return for the candy.
Now A will be called upon to explain to his son that his authority
26Willis, The Constitution of the United States at the End of One Hundred Fifty Years, Bloomington, Indiana, 1939, at 39: "The Congress shall
have the power of eminent domain for the benefit of... its spending power."
Mr. Willis cites James v. Dravo Contracting Co., (1937) 302 U. S. 134,
58 S. Ct. 208, 82 L. Ed. 155, for this proposition. The Dravo'case, however,
rests its decision upon Article I, section 8, clause 17, by construing locks
and dams as "needful buildings" within the meaning of this clause. In the
case of United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., (1896) 160 U. S. 668,
the language of the court might seem to give some support to the sweeping
contention of Mr. Willis. Mr. Justice Peckham, referring to the use of land
as a national cemetery declared: "Such a use seems necessarily, not only a
public use, but one so closely connected with the welfare of the Republic itself
as to be within the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution for the
purpose of protecting and preserving the whole country." The decision was
based on the war powers, however, and like every case to date falls far
short of declaring the power of eminent domain to be a necessary and proper
adjunct of the spending power.
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did not extend to control over the boy next door, but only to control of the money. Inherent in the power to spend, which A
granted, was a natural limitation set by the vendor's willingness
to sell. The situation is no different with respect to the power to
spend for the general welfare, which the founding fathers conferred upon the Congress. They fully intended that this power
should be a power over the money involved and should be limited
by the available market. There is no fair implication that Congress may employ coercive means to effectuate this power. In fact,
since the power involves nothing more than an appropriation of
money, the authors of the Constitution must have conceived of
it as fully executed at that point, without need of any further
means in its accomplishment. The power is a purely legislative
one, and can not be augmented or diminished by any subsequent
conditions. Whether the money appropriated is finally spent, or
remains unspent because there is no seller's market or because a
government gratuity is not accepted, is important only in determining what funds are available for future appropriation. In no
event can the government reasonably conclude that the power to
spend gives it the right to compel the acceptance of its funds.
The Supreme Court recognizes this and is willing, therefore, to
uphold mere appropriation in every instance as a valid exercise
of the Congressional power. But when Congress attempts to go
beyond appropriation and compel the designated recipients to accept the funds which it has appropriated, the Court will not then
uphold the enactment under the spending power, and will invalidate
it unless it can be justified under one of the other delegated powers.
The Butler case may seem to be a contradiction of what has just
been said, but careful analysis proves that it is not. The Court
decided that the tax in question was not a revenue measure, but was
rather a means of achieving agricultural regulation. The tax was
held to be invalid for this reason. In the same act Congress had
provided for an appropriation equal to the amount of the tax.
This appropriation was for agricultural purposes and clearly within the concept of the general welfare. The dissent argued that the
appropriation should be upheld regardless of whether or not the
tax be judged valid. They reasoned, much as in the manner set
forth above, that appropriation for the general welfare is clearly
within the powers of Congress and can not be invalidated by the
fact that farmers may or may not feel themselves compelled by
circumstances to accept the funds. If there were any coercion involved in the acceptance thereof it was not due to any act of Con-
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gress,:but rather to external conditions in the nation at large, and
Congress could not be penalized for this. This was sound reasoning
and the majority did not try to meet it. The majority spoke a great
deal about the fact that the expenditure involved was part of an
unlawful plan revealed on the face of the act, which was to regulate agriculture, but their decision was based on the notion that
since Congress could not collect the money in the first place there
was no money for it to appropriate. They expressly refused to
consider whether agriculture fell within the concept of general
welfare. They were correct in stating that this was not pertinent
to the ruling, since they had already decided that the funds appropriated by Congress could never be brought into being. Moreover,
if the argument of the dissent be accepted that the tax was merely
a convenient means of measuring the extent of the appropriation,
that extent could not be measured, since the tax was void, and
mere physical law would compel one to conclude that the appropriation, too, must fall. Clearly, therefore, the decision did not
rest upon the general welfare concept, but rather upon the factual
situation which made it appear to the majority that Congress was
attempting to spend something which it did not have. However
one may disagree with the conclusion, the logic of the position
taken by the majority, once one accepts their major premise, is
unassailable. There are those who scoff at this reasoning because,
under it, the difficulty could bave been resolved had the taxing
measure and appropriation measure been set forth in separate acts.
The argument is made that it is ridiculous to suppose that the factual situation would have been any different as the result of such
an expedient. But this argument completely ignores the limits which
the Court has set for itself. The significance lies not in the fact that
the actual. purpose of the Congress would be altered, but simply in
the fact that the evidences of that purpose would no longer be present. The Court has said that it will not look beyond the face of the
act to determine the purpose of Congress. Obviously, if the appropriation measure is not in the taxing act the Court can not look to
the appropriation in order to discover a clue as to the purpose of
the tax. And if the taxing measure is not coupled with the appropriation, the Court can not look to the tax in order to discover that
the funds do not exist. Certainly the factual situation remains the
same, but the Court does not have the same evidences before it,
and can not arrive at the same conclusion. The Court could, of
course, reach the same result itself by regarding the facts as they
appear on the face of the act in such a way that their effect is the
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same as though embodied in separate acts. Thus, although both
tax and appropriation are present on the face of the act the Court
can look only to the tax in settling the tax issue and only to the
appropriation in deciding the question of the expenditure. This
is precisely what the Court did in the Steward Machine case, and
it could have done so in the Butler case if it were so inclined. The
advantage of separating the measures, however, is to insure that
this practice will be the only possible one. The assurance can fail
only if the Court repudiates its policy of looking to the face of
the act for the purpose involved, and it is safe to say that there is
little danger of such a repudiation, since the difficulties which it
would introduce are too many for the Court to entertain.
The self-imposed separation of tax and expenditure which the
Court evidenced in the Steward Machine case is repeated in its
companion case Helvering v. Davis.27 Mr. Justice Cardozo, who
delivered the opinion of the Court, made a half-hearted attempt to
distinguish the Butler Case on its facts, but it is perfectly clear
to even a casual reader that in the Helvering case the opinion
simply embodies the minority finding of fact in the Butler case.
It may be that Mr. Justice Cardozo, who was in the minority in the
Butler case, attempted the distinction out of respect for the feelings
of his less astute brethren, but one can not escape the conclusion
that he purposely condemned the argument by his faint support
of it. The Helvering case involved the expenditure of the tax
which had been controverted in the Stezeard case. The appropriation was to relieve old age unemployment and was unquestionably for the general welfare. The right of Congress to spend
money for this purpose was upheld, notwithstanding the ultimate
effect it might have had upon the states' control of the old age
problem. In the Steard case the tax has been upheld as a reveneti
measure. It was only natural, therefore, that the expenditure in
the Helvering case should be regarded as an appropriation for the
general welfare and valid under the spending power. In the Butler
case the Court had found that the funds could not be raised in the
first instance, and were compelled by logic to conclude that the
non-existent funds could not thereafter be spent. In the Helvering
case the Court contented itself with a procedure entailing separate
examination of the taxing and appropriation measures, and had
no difficulty in discovering by this means that the tax could be
collected, and that the money could be spent. Through self-discipline it avoided the possibility of the kind of result it achieved
27(1937) 301 U. S. 619. 57 S. Ct. 904. 81 L. Ed. 1307.
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in the Bt.tler case where the invalidity of the tax meant that, as
a-.matter of logic, the Congress could not expend what it did not
possess.
CONCLUSION

Probably the most accurate conclusion of any such work as
this would be one which left the door open for the reader to draw

his own. But my experience with readers in general has taught
me that they are exceedingly lazy in this respect, and I prefer to
draw a conclusion which is necessarily tentative, rather than submit to the indignity of none at all.
I think we may conclude from the general discussion and the
cases which have been examined, that the Supreme Court of the
United States is as much bound by the formal language and inheritances of antiquity as is the rest of human society. If it exhibits this characteristic -with better grace than the rest of us it
is only because the rest of us are slow in discovering it. The Supreme Court considers itself obliged to follow the avowed interpretation of the taxing-spending clause as it has been followed
throughout one hundred and fifty years-by devoted movement
of the lips. Once this perfunctory service has been accomplished,
however, the Court's conscience is clear and it feels free to decide
its cases in conformity with the actual construction of the instrument and with those principles which antedate it. It is to be hoped
that as the Court acquires a fuller appreciation of the basic considerations which impel it to a certain conduct, the explanations
which it offers will accord more closely to the decisions it makes.2s
But this is of, small moment as long as we recognize the human
foibles of the Court and discover for ourselves the real distinctions which underly its decisions. This we must do even at the
expense of discarding age-old shibboleths. The reward is not alone
our complete understanding of the problems which confront us,
but also in the heritage which we hand down to future generations
of legal scholars.
It may be that by our repeated efforts to separate words from
actions, and by delving beneath the superficial and apparent explanation of things, we shall create a generation of legal scholars
-8For a stimulating analysis of the factors which create a divergence be-

tween a court's words and its actions in another field of law, see Leon Green.
Judge and Jpury, Kansas City, Mo.: Vernon Law Book Co., 1930. Dean Green
demonstrates throughout this work an excellent understanding of the extrajudicial elements in any legal opinion. Even allowing for over emphasis
this book illustrates how misleading it is to take too literally a judge's official
estimate of the considerations which have determined his judgment.
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instilled with an element of the doubting Thomas. This might
alarm us if doubting were for the sake of doubting and nothing
more, since that would be a fatuous pursuit of remedy. But surely
it is for the sake of the constructive analysis which any keen mind
feels called upon to make in the presence of doubt, and therefore
is to be encouraged by all sincere students of the law. Sciolists
have too long retarded the forward march of our profession by
indolently adhering to the past without any greater justification
than that others before them so believed. This attitude toward the
logic of legal study serves only to compound the emptiness of such
an offering. If there is any fair conclusion which we may reach at
this point, it is that the future of law, as in every field of human
endeavor, is most swiftly advanced through the reexamination of
established concepts and their realignment in our working system.

